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Trust and management: Explaining cross-national differences in work autonomy
Introduction
In their effort to understand economic development, economists are increasingly digging beyond macro-level data on per-capita output, considering industry and plant-level variation in productivity (Syverson, 2011) . Detailed analyses reveal wide and persistent dispersion in productivity levels among firms. To understand these differences, we have to open the black box of what goes on in firms that makes some firms so much more successful than others.
Management practices are an important part of the answer (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007) , but only to the extent that they offer a new black box concerning the factors that drive firm heterogeneity in management practices (Van Reenen, 2011) .
For some time, researchers have realized that trust matters for organizations, for instance, allowing firms to increase in size while maintaining levels of intra-firm cooperation (La Porta et al., 1997) . Similarly, Bloom et al. (2012) empirically demonstrate that so-called bilateral trust, meaning trust between two countries, affects the extent to which multinational companies from a particular home country decentralize and give decision power to local managers in a particular host country. More generally, trust is linked to reduced uncertainty and transaction costs, which increases the extent of the market (Fukuyama, 1995) . Many studies subsequently show the benefits of societal trust for economic development (e.g., Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Knack and Keefer, 1997 ; see Algan and Cahuc, 2013 for a survey).
We link societal trust to work autonomy, which is defined as "the condition or quality of being self-governing or free from excessive external control" (Jermier and Michaels, 2001: 1006) . Work autonomy is associated with advantages and disadvantages for firms. Following past thinking on the division of labor (e.g., Becker and Murphy 1992) , a key advantage of work autonomy is that it increases employees' productivity as it sustains more specialization in the production process. At the same time, work autonomy is associated with certain disadvantages, as reflected in the standard principal-agent problem. If workers have complete autonomy, there are no formal governance mechanisms preventing them from pursuing their own interests at the expense of the firm's. Trust, however, mitigates the principal-agent problem. Monitoring and control are simply less urgent when two parties can trust each other, i.e., when the principal can rely on the agent to act in the best interest of the principal without any explicit incentive to do so.
Hence, below we test the following hypothesis: the higher societal trust is, the higher the level of work autonomy that employers grant to their employees.
Empirical analysis
Data
Measures of work autonomy are typically subjective, asking people to rate their level of autonomy at work. We use data from the well-known European Social Survey (ESS), Wave 1-5 (2002 Wave 1-5 ( -2004 Wave 1-5 ( -2006 Wave 1-5 ( -2008 Wave 1-5 ( -2010 (http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org). The specific item that we use asks respondents to say how much the management at their work allows/allowed them to decide how their own daily work is organized with answers ranging from 0, "I have/had no influence" to 10, "I have/had complete control." Extensive checks show that the measure thus obtained is valid, correlating with external factors in the precise manner expected. Autonomy increases with skill level and managers have more autonomy than subordinates do, for instance (Table 1) . To be sure, our interest is in societal trust and the level of work autonomy of individuals in general. We thus do not study the trust level of a specific principal and how this affects the autonomy granted to a specific agent, although this can be a question for future research. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the sample as a whole. (2004) to control for formal institutions specifically aimed at governing the relationship between employers and employees. We further control for per-capita GDP, using data from the World Bank World Development Indicators.
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Finally, to consider the issue of causality we use a pure trust measure that is not co-determined by reigning socio-economic and institutional circumstances. Specifically, we use the inherited component of trust for the year 2000, as developed in Algan and Cahuc (2010) . If data are not available, we drop the country from the analysis.
The four cultural clusters not covered by the sample are the African cluster (e.g., Namibia and Zambia), the Confucian cluster (e.g., China and Japan), the Southeast Asian cluster (e.g., India and the Philippines), and the Latin American cluster (e.g., Brazil and Mexico). The countries in the sample not covered by the GLOBE classification (9 in total) are: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Luxembourg, Slovakia, and Ukraine.
Method
Our analysis concerns respondents nested countries. We thus separate the variation at the two levels-between countries and within countries-and model them simultaneously, while taking into account the clustering of observations. The complete model reads as follows:
where jk A denotes the level of work autonomy granted to individual j in country k, k T is the level of trust, jk x is a set of individual-level control variables (e.g., age), and k z is a set of country-level control variables (e.g., GDP). 00 γ is the mean (intercept) that is fixed over all countries. There are two error terms, one at the individual ( jk e ) and one at the country level ( 0k u ). The model is a mixed model (McCulloch and Searle, 2001 ) that combines random and fixed effects. Specifically, the country-level error term means that the intercept is allowed to vary across countries, which is a way to incorporate country fixed effects. Values for the countryspecific intercepts can be obtained as posterior estimates. The method is Bayesian, applying shrinkage to draw outliers towards the sample distribution and allowing us to make inferences about the entire population of countries rather than just the sample. We estimate the model using maximum likelihood procedures. increase their autonomy by 2.6 points on the 0-10 scale, ceteris paribus.
Results
Discussion and conclusion
We have sought to open the black box of how firms manage their operations, showing that trust fosters the level of autonomy that firms grant to their workers. Management practices are increasingly recognized for their vital implications, both for firms themselves but also for societies as a whole (e.g., Syverson, 2011; Van Reenen, 2011) . Similarly, a growing literature is concerned with the economic consequences of informal institutions such as trust (e.g., Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Algan and Cahuc, 2013) . Our note contributes to these two developing literatures,
showing micro-level ramifications of trust that may go on to impact economies as a whole.
Future research may provide a more direct assessment, using micro evidence on trust as a factor shaping economic activity to pin down how exactly trust matters for macro-level economic development.
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